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Abstract
As emerging powers rise and established powers decline, international institutions come
under pressure to adjust to new power realities. When and how do international institu-
tions adapt to underlying global power shifts? We propose an (institutionalist) theory of
strategic co-optation that differs from both (realist) accommodationist and (liberal) inte-
grationist theories. Drawing on isolated treatments of strategic co-optation from other
domains – domestic and international, autocratic and democratic, past and present –
we develop a theory of strategic co-optation as a mode of institutional adaption to shifts
in the global distribution of power. The theory specifies the concept, the conditions and
the (unintended) consequences of strategic co-optation. We conceptualize co-optation as a
specific form of adaptation where established powers trade institutional privileges for
emerging powers’ institutional support. We theorize the conditions under which emerging
and established powers are (more or less) likely to strike a co-optation deal. In addition,
we identify endogenous dynamics that may render co-optation precarious and thus subject
to instabilities. While the ambition of this paper is primarily theoretical, we provide
various empirical illustrations of how strategic co-optation is used to adapt international
institutions to contemporary shifts in the global distribution of power.
Keywords: power shift; power transition; institutional change; co-optation; international institutions;
global order
Contending approaches to global power shifts
As emerging powers such as China and India rise and established powers such as
the USA and the UK decline, international institutions such as the United Nations
(UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and the World Bank (WB) come under pressure to adapt to shifts in the
global distribution of power. When and how do they adapt?
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Earlier power transition theories (PTTs) discussed whether peaceful institutional
adaptations to power transitions, in which a rising challenger replaces a declining
hegemon, were actually possible (Organski 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin
1981; Modelski 1987, 2005; Layne 1993). More recent power shift theories (PSTs)
have given up the traditional PTT focus on full-blown power transitions to study
institutional adaptations to global power shifts instead (Schweller and Pu 2011;
Stephen 2012; Kahler 2013; Paul 2016). Power shifts imply that emerging powers
overtake some of the established powers, but, in contrast to full-blown power
transitions, are not (yet) able to challenge the incumbent hegemon. Many recent
PST contributions have likewise moved their focus from studying shifts in the over-
all power structure towards issue-area-specific power shifts (Schirm 2010; Wade
2011; Hopewell 2015; Zangl et al. 2016).1 Instead of analyzing the global order
as a whole, they study the adaptation of specific institutions to issue-area-specific
global power shifts (Stephen 2012; Lipscy 2017; Daßler, Kruck and Zangl 2018).
Moreover, recent PST contributions challenge the gloomy assumption of earlier
PTTs that institutional adaptations are rarely possible and major warfare is
inevitable (Ikenberry 2009, 2011a, b; Kirshner 2012; Kahler 2013; Paul 2016).
Even PST contributions that draw on realist theories of International Relations
(IR) argue that established powers may accommodate emerging powers’ demands
for institutional adjustments that reflect their improved power position (Kirshner
2012; Paul 2016). To be sure, the accommodationist approach highlights that
power shifts will exacerbate conflicts of interest between established and emerging
powers entailing the risk of war. It is, however, precisely this risk that can provide
an incentive for established powers to proactively manage the rise of emerging
powers by accommodating them through institutional adjustments. After all,
these institutional adjustments may prevent the need for a fundamental institu-
tional overhaul in the future when the distribution of power shifts further in
favor of the emerging powers.
Many PST contributions that draw on liberal traditions in IR argue, by contrast,
that emerging powers will seek their integration into the current order and its
institutions rather than asking for far-reaching institutional adjustments. These
integrationist approaches assume that the current global order is easier to join
and more difficult to overthrow than previous orders (Ikenberry and Wright
2008; Ikenberry 2009, 2011a, b; Kahler 2013). As it was the current order that
allowed them to rise, emerging powers are more interested in sustaining it and
its institutions than in overthrowing them. Moreover, through their previous inte-
gration into the order and its institutions, emerging powers have gone through a
process of socialization and have already internalized the order’s most fundamental
principles. This allows for their fairly harmonious further integration into the order
and its institutions.
1Accordingly, we identify established and emerging powers based on their issue-area-specific (relative)
material capabilities (Brooks and Wohlforth 2015/2016). In many issue areas, we consider states such as
the USA, the UK, France, and Germany as established powers because, in terms of their issue-area-specific
power resources (such as GDP with regard to trade), they have been the most powerful states over several
decades. By contrast, states such as China, India, and Brazil are in many issue areas emerging powers
because, in terms of issue-area-specific power resources, they have been able to overtake some of the
established powers within the last two decades.
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From our point of view, both accommodationist and integrationist approaches
identify important modes of institutional adjustment to the shifts in the global
distribution of power. However, insofar as they focus on either conflictual accom-
modation or harmonious integration, they overlook a third mode of institutional
adaptation that we call strategic co-optation. To some extent, co-optation is a com-
bination of accommodation and integration, and we find occasional references to
‘co-optation’ in both accommodationist and integrationist PST contributions
(Stephen 2012, 296–298; Acharya 2014, 154; Paul 2016, 18; Newman and Zala
2018, 871). However, co-optation differs from both accommodation and integration
in important ways. Accommodation means that established powers adjust (unilat-
erally) to emerging powers’ demands for institutional adaptation; integration, on
the other hand, means that emerging powers adjust (unilaterally) to the existing
institutions. Co-optation, by contrast, is a specific form of mutual adjustment. It
implies that established and emerging powers trade institutional privileges (as in
accommodation) for institutional support (as in integration). For example, in the
wake of the global financial crisis (2008), China provided crucial financial support
to contain the crisis and thus stabilize the IMF in exchange for increased voting
rights in the IMF (Wade 2011; Keukeleire and Hooijmaaijers 2014).
The aim of this paper is to develop a theory of strategic co-optation and to
illustrate its empirical relevance with regard to the adaptation of international
institutions to global power shifts.2 Drawing on isolated treatments from various
domains – domestic (cf. Selznick 1964; Hale 2015) and international (cf. Lake
2009; Abbott et al. 2019), autocratic (cf. Dickson 2000, 2008; Reuter and
Robertson 2015) and democratic (cf. Lehmbruch 1984, 1987), past (cf. Trotha
1994; Wilson 2016) and present (cf. Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Geddes et al.
2018) – we develop a theory that specifies, for the specific context of institutional
adaptation to shifts in the global distribution of power, the concept, the conditions,
and the (unintended) consequences of strategic co-optation. We first conceptualize
co-optation as a specific form of mutual adjustment – or cooperation – in which
established and emerging powers trade institutional privileges for institutional sup-
port. We go on to theorize the conditions under which, in the face of a global power
shift, emerging and established powers are (more or less) likely to agree on a deal of
this kind. We then discuss endogenous dynamics that can stabilize co-optation, but
also destabilize it rendering it precarious. In the conclusion we summarize and sug-
gest that our theory may also improve understanding of strategic co-optation
beyond the context of institutional adaptations to global power shifts (i.e. beyond
this scope condition).
2Drawing on Krasner (1983) and Keohane (1989), we define international institutions as sets of inter-
national rules, norms and principles – be they substantive or procedural, formal, or informal – around
which actors’ expectations of appropriate behavior converge. International institutions include international
organizations such as the WTO, international regimes such as the nuclear non-proliferation regime and
international networks such as the G7.
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Conceptualizing strategic co-optation
Generally, co-optation entails that individual or collective actors are brought closer
to the leadership of an institution. It is a specific process of institutional adjustment
where either the exercise or the burden of power, or both, are increasingly shared
between existing power holders and other power centers to stabilize an institution
(Selznick 1964; Dickson 2000; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Examples of
co-optation from the domestic realm include the co-optation of labor unions
(Lehmbruch 1984), churches (Abdullah 2015), or ethnic minorities (Pettai and
Hallik 2002) into the institutions of democratic states, as well as the co-optation
of opposition parties (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006), regional leaders (Reuter
and Robertson 2015), private entrepreneurs (Dickson 2000, 2008; Gerschewski
2019), elite networks (Hale 2015), or rebel groups (Thomas, Kiser and Casebeer
2005, 124–125; Salehyan 2019) into the institutions of autocratic regimes
(Wintrobe 1998; Geddes et al. 2018). Examples from the international realm
include the co-optation of local chiefs into colonial empires (Crowder 1964;
Trotha 1994, 261) or of client states into hegemonic orders (Lake 2009).
We focus on strategic co-optation, which we conceptualize as the result of strategic
choices made by the co-optor and the co-optee. Independent of the specific context,
their fundamental co-optation bargain is always the same: they trade institutional
privileges for institutional support to stabilize the institutional order (Selznick
1964, 135–136). When democratic leaders engage in co-optation, they provide, in
exchange for support, tax exemptions to churches, privileged representation for eth-
nic minorities or consultation rights for unions (Lehmbruch 1987). When autocratic
leaders engage in co-optation, then, in return for support, they give opposition parties
seats in parliament, include economic elites in their governing coalitions and provide
ministerial posts for rebel leaders (Dickson 2000; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006;
Reuter and Robertson 2015). When colonial states co-opted local chiefs, they gave
them institutional privileges and opportunities for rent-seeking in return for their
support (Trotha 1994). Hegemonic powers that co-opt client states typically give
them security guarantees in return for their loyalty (Lake 2009). In each of these
cases, the co-optor grants institutional privileges that give co-optees a stake in
stabilizing the existing order (Baur and Schmitz 2012, 11; Gerschewski 2013, 22).
As these examples indicate, strategic co-optation requires cooperation. The
co-optor grants privileges and the co-optee gives support in return. However, stra-
tegic co-optation is a very specific form of cooperation – and not only because the
co-optor and co-optee trade institutional privileges for institutional support, but
also because it is not a form of horizontal cooperation among equals, but rather of
vertical cooperation among unequal actors with the co-optor having more authority
than the co-optee (Selznick 1964; Dickson 2000; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). Ex
ante, co-optors dominate the order and its underlying institutions. They are in a lead-
ership position. They have institutional privileges and thus authority that co-optees
lack. Ex post, co-optation reduces the status hierarchy between co-optor and
co-optee. Through the granting of institutional privileges, co-optation typically
gives co-optees more authority and brings them closer to the leadership of the
order and its institutions. Yet, co-optees usually do not become equal co-leaders.
In return for support, they gain privileges, but they do not gain the same privileges
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– and thus the same authority – as the co-optors. When autocratic governments
co-opt leaders of the opposition by giving them seats in parliament (Gandhi and
Przeworski 2006) or democratic governments co-opt the leaders of the labor unions
or employer associations by incorporating them into their policy making
(Lehmbruch 1987), they still keep them subordinated. Co-optation preserves some
status hierarchy (Dickson 2000; Bertocchi and Spagat 2001; Hale 2015).
While co-optation always entails the same vertical cooperation among unequal
actors that exchange institutional privileges for institutional support, the privileges
granted and the support provided may vary substantially:
• First, whether formal or informal, the institutional privileges gained by the
co-optee will be either procedural or substantive. Procedural privileges entail
co-optees gaining more influence in the policy-making process (Lehmbruch
1987). The 2002 opening of the Chinese Communist Party to private entrepre-
neurs in return for their support of the communist regime may serve as an
example. In becoming party members, private entrepreneurs not only
enhanced their social status, they also improved their ability to make their
economic interests heard (Dickson 2008). Privileges can, however, also be
substantive (Reuter and Robertson 2015). In return for their support in the
run-up to the 1996 presidential elections, President Yeltsin offered the
managers of big Russian oil and gas companies the opportunity to become
the owners of those companies (Shleifer and Treisman 2005).
• Second, whether ideational or material, the support co-optees provide to sta-
bilize the existing order can be either specific or diffuse (Easton 1975).
Co-opting specific support entails the co-opted party fulfilling a specific
task in exchange for the institutional privileges granted by the co-optor.
The co-optation of the Russian oligarchs who supported President Yeltsin’s
1996 electoral campaign in return for becoming the owners of the gas and
oil companies they managed provides an example (Shleifer and Treismann
2005). Co-opting diffuse support implies, by contrast, that in return for
the privileges granted, the co-optee is expected to be generally loyal to the
order and its underlying institutions (Hale 2015; Geddes et al. 2018). The
communist leadership in China did not open up the party with the objective
of private entrepreneurs fulfilling a specific task. Instead, private entrepre-
neurs were encouraged to get party membership to give them a stake in main-
taining the order and thus to generally enhance their support for the
communist regime (Dickson 2008).
Importantly, strategic co-optation – understood as vertical cooperation among
unequal actors that exchange institutional privileges for institutional support – is
also common when international institutions adjust to shifts in the global distribu-
tion of power. Established powers co-opt emerging powers to stabilize international
institutions and the order they underpin. For example, in the aftermath of the 2008
global financial crisis, the USA and the other G7 states offered emerging powers
such as Brazil, India, and China (the BICs) an institutional upgrade of the G20
from being a forum of finance ministers to being a forum of heads of government.
Through this partial replacement of the G7, they granted emerging economies the
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privilege of membership in the exclusive club of leading economic powers that gov-
ern the global political economy. They did so in return for the BICs’ institutional
support. The latter pledged financial resources to help contain the financial crisis
and endorsed the G20 as a crucial global economic governance forum. In the
end, the upgrade of the G20 brought the BICs closer to the core leadership of global
economic governance, but, as the G7 continues to exist, its members retain a pri-
vileged position in the G20 (Wade 2011; Cooper and Thakur 2013; Kirton 2013).
The co-optation of the BICs into the G20 is not, in fact, an exceptional case
of co-optation in the wake of shifts in the global distribution of power. As we
will indicate below, China’s integration into the WTO, India’s unofficial recognition
as a nuclear power, China’s increased voting rights in the IMF, Germany, Japan,
India, and Brazil’s (i.e. the G4’s) attempt to gain permanent seats in the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC), and China’s inclusion in the WTO core
negotiation group provide additional examples.
Conditions for strategic co-optation
While we consider co-optation an important means of adjusting international
institutions to global power shifts, we also highlight the fact that emerging and
established powers are not always able to agree on it (Stephen 2012). What, there-
fore, are the conditions for co-optation and thus the exchange of institutional
privileges for support? To answer this question, we draw again on the treatments
of co-optation cited above from other domains.
While often more implicit than explicit, the most fundamental assumption
of most co-optation accounts is that co-optation is only possible if the benefits
outweigh the costs for both co-optor and co-optee (Bertocchi and Spagat 2001).
For the co-optor, the gains from the co-optee’s support of the order must outweigh
the relative loss implied by granting institutional privileges to the co-optee. For the
co-optee, the benefits of additional institutional privileges must outweigh the costs
of supporting the order. But what shapes the cost–benefit assessment of co-optors
and co-optees? In the following, we elaborate on three conditions. We begin by
conceptualizing the existence of a fundamental institutional challenge as a neces-
sary condition for strategic co-optation. We then discuss two probability drivers
of strategic co-optation: the availability of willing and able co-optees on the one
hand, and the institutional opportunities for the co-optation parties to overcome
resistance from interested third parties on the other.
Fundamental challenge as a necessary condition
Many co-optation accounts regard a fundamental challenge to the order and its
institutions as an important condition for strategic co-optation – some even con-
sider it a defining feature (Selznick 1964; Dickson 2000; Gandhi and Przeworski
2006). Following these accounts, we regard a fundamental challenge to the existing
order and its institutions a necessary condition for strategic co-optation.
However, different accounts of co-optation focus on different challenges. By fus-
ing these isolated accounts into one theory of strategic co-optation, we highlight
two key distinctions:
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(1) Authority vs. governance challenge: Co-optors may draw on co-optation to
cope with challenges to their authority. This is the focus of the literature on
co-optation in modern autocracies (Wintrobe 1998; Dickson 2000; Gerschewski
2013, 2019; Hale 2015; Geddes et al. 2018). It shows, for instance, that autocratic
regimes use parliamentary assemblies to tame the opposition to their authority
by giving opposition leaders the institutional privilege of parliamentary member-
ship (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). This gives those leaders a stake in the main-
tenance of the existing order and strengthens the diffuse support for it (Dickson
2008). Here, strategic co-optation is a technique used to maintain authority.
However, co-optors may also draw on co-optation to deal with challenges to their
governance capacity. This is the focus of the literature on co-optation in modern
democracies, which regards co-optation as an attempt by democratic leaders to
improve their ability to govern (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Lehmbruch 1984,
1987). Co-optors bring in co-optees because the latter have the expertise, legitim-
acy, credibility or operative capacities needed for governance to be successful
(Abbott et al. 2019). For instance, today’s bureaucracies try to improve their admin-
istrative capacities by incorporating civil society actors with specific competencies
into their administrative procedures (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Lehmbruch
1987). Here, strategic co-optation is a governance technique.
(2) Internal vs. external challenges: Whether they are facing an authority or a
governance challenge, co-optors may engage in co-optation to address internal
or external challenges. If they co-opt to deal with internal challenges, they bring
in the very actors that are challenging the order and the institutions they dominate.
By means of co-optation, they try to turn challengers into supporters of the order
and its institutions (Dickson 2008; Gerschewski 2013). The co-optation of German
tribes – the Goths and later the Vandals – into the Roman Empire provides a good
example of this. In the 4th century, the frequent invasions by these tribes posed a
serious challenge to the Empire. To cope with this challenge, the Emperor decided
to make their leaders Roman citizens and give them the task of policing the
Empire’s borders, thus turning invaders into border guards (Wilson 2016, 37).
If co-optors deal with external challenges, they enlist co-optees to cope with
challenges that stem from third parties. In this case, co-optation often amounts
to a form of coalition building against a third-party challenge (Trotha 1994; Lake
2009). The Pope’s co-optation of the Franks in the 8th century serves as an example
of this. The Pope required military support to protect the Church against its
enemies. In return for Pepin the Short’s military support, Pope Zachary crowned
him Frankish king in 751, thereby sanctioning his coup against the Merovingians.
In 800, Pope Leo III even crowned Pepin’s successor, Charlemagne, Emperor of
the Holy Roman Empire to gain his support against the Church’s enemies. By
means of co-optation, the Pope turned the Carolingians into defenders of the
Church (Wilson 2016, 39–40).
Crossing the two distinctions, we derive four types of challenges (see Table 1).
We claim that all the four types of fundamental challenges alter the cost–benefit
assessments of would-be co-optors, thereby making co-optation possible. When
faced with a fundamental challenge, co-optors’ demands for additional support
to stabilize the order will rise. The benefits of co-optation will increase relative to
its costs. Co-optors might therefore be prepared to offer institutional privileges
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in return for co-optee support. By contrast, without such a challenge, co-optors
have little incentive to co-opt others into the order they dominate. Why should
they give out privileges for support they do not need? The benefits would not out-
weigh the costs. Thus, while certainly not sufficient, a fundamental challenge to the
order appears to be necessary for co-optation to be possible. However, each type of
challenge comes with a distinct reason why the benefits of co-optation may
outweigh its costs (see Table 1). All four reasons feature prominently in cases of
institutional adaptation to today’s global power shifts.
Taming opposition: In the face of an internal challenge to their authority,
co-optors may engage in co-optation to tame the opposition (Dickson 2000;
Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Hale 2015; Geddes et al. 2018). India’s incorporation
into the nuclear non-proliferation regime (or NPT regime) through its unofficial
recognition as a nuclear power provides an example. India, among others, chal-
lenged the legitimacy of the NPT regime as it strictly enforced the commitment
of non-nuclear states to refrain from seeking nuclear weapons, while at the same
time largely ignoring the fact that states with nuclear weapons consistently violated
their commitment to reduce their nuclear weapon arsenals. As a result, the NPT
regime went through a severe authority crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Through India’s unofficial recognition as a nuclear power – by means of the
2008 waiver of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) – the USA and other nuclear
weapons states tried to tame India’s opposition and contain the NPT regime’s
authority crisis (Mistry 2014; Perkovich 2010).
Employing spoilers: In the face of internal governance challenges, co-optors may
employ as co-optees the same actors that are spoiling their governance efforts
(Salehyan 2019; Tamm 2019). The inclusion of China in the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) provides an example (Knaack 2017). In the
1990s and 2000s, China’s banking sector grew considerably. At the same time,
China was not a member of the BCBS, compromising the BCBS’s capacity to prom-
ulgate effective global standards for banking regulation. As a non-member, China’s
implementation of BCBS standards was slow and piecemeal. By offering China (and
other emerging powers) BCBS membership in 2009, the USA and the EU addressed
this internal governance challenge. A potential spoiler of the BCBS was incorpo-
rated into the global banking regulation order. As a result, China has turned
‘from laggard to primus inter pares’ (Knaack 2017, 50), introducing regulations
that were even stricter than the recent Basel III standards demanded and imple-
mented ahead of the agreed schedule.
Table 1. Types of challenges and co-optor’s reasons for co-optation
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Committing partners: In the face of an external authority challenge, co-optors
may engage in co-optation to commit partners to help them stabilize the order
(Bertocchi and Spagat 2001). China’s promotion as a member of the WTO
core negotiation group provides an example. Soon after China became a WTO
member in 2001, the USA and other established powers included China in the
WTO core negotiation group – the so-called Quad. They did so with the expect-
ation that China would help contain the authority challenge posed by India and
Brazil, who had fought their way into the Quad. Established powers (erroneously)
hoped that China, as a supporter of free trade, would contribute to reining in
India’s and Brazil’s opposition and the obstructive tactics they used in the Doha
Round negotiations, thus mitigating the authority challenge the latter posed to
the WTO (Hopewell 2015).
Enlisting competence: Co-optors may also engage in co-optation to improve their
ability to cope with an external governance challenge. In this case, they enlist com-
petence (Abbott et al. 2019). The co-optation of China into the leadership of the
IMF after the 2008 global financial crisis provides an example. The established
powers, especially the USA, offered China an increase in its shares within the
IMF’s weighted voting system. They did so to convince China to shore up its
financial support for the stabilization of a global financial system under stress
(Wade 2011; Keukeleire and Hooijmaaijers 2014). Similarly, the 2007/08 upgrade
of the G20 from a forum of finance ministers to a forum of heads of government
served to enlist emerging economies’ financial competencies to contain the global
financial crisis (Wade 2011; Cooper and Thakur 2013; Kirton 2013).
To sum up, we highlight that a fundamental challenge to the order and its insti-
tutions is a necessary condition for strategic co-optation. Absent such a challenge,
the co-optor’s benefits will not outweigh the costs of co-optation. By distinguishing
four types of challenges, we have also specified four distinct reasons why, in the face
of a specific challenge, the benefits of co-optation may outweigh its costs.
Co-optee availability as a probability driver
A fundamental challenge to an order or its underlying institutions will hardly lead
to co-optation if there are no co-optees that are both able and willing to provide the
support needed to stabilize the order. For both co-optors and co-optees, the costs
and benefits of co-optation – and, consequently, the incentive to engage in
co-optation – depend on the degree to which potential co-optees are systemically
relevant and the degree to which they agree with the social purpose of the existing
order and its institutions. Therefore, we argue that the availability of co-optees
that are systemically relevant for and in agreement with the social purpose of the
existing order is the most important probability driver of strategic co-optation.
To begin with, co-optation is more likely when there are systemically relevant
actors available that can be brought closer to the order’s core leadership
(Schmitter 1985). Systemic relevance implies that actors are not only powerful
but that they have sufficient capabilities – material or ideational – to destabilize
the order on their own and are, thus, critical for stabilizing the order (Viola
2018; Zürn 2018). Systemically relevant actors, in other words, can use their
capacities to challenge the order or help to overcome challenges to it. Therefore,
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co-optors have an incentive to nurture – through co-optation – systemically rele-
vant actors’ interest in contributing to the maintenance of the order. This is the rea-
son why autocrats typically co-opt the leadership of the most powerful opposition
parties rather than the leaders of smaller opposition groups (Dickson 2000, 2008;
Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). The availability of actors with systemic relevance
will also enhance the incentives of these would-be co-optees to accept being
co-opted. As systemically relevant actors, they have a bigger incentive to contribute
to the stabilization of the order. As their support is crucial, freeriding on the con-
tributions of others becomes impossible. With their support making a, if not the,
difference to the stability of the order, their incentive to provide support in return
for institutional privileges increases (Olson 1965).
However, the availability of actors with systemic relevance is unlikely to lead to
co-optation if these actors do not agree on the social purpose and the fundamental
principles of the order and its institutions (Johnson 2016; Abbott et al. 2019). Thus,
co-optation is unlikely, if only revisionist or revolutionary actors are available. It
becomes more likely, if there are reformist actors available.3 This makes co-optation
easier for the co-optor because it can trust that the co-optee will not use its insti-
tutional privileges to revise the order’s fundamental principles, let alone its social
purpose. Moreover, co-optors have to offer less far-reaching privileges to gain
support from co-optees that are in agreement with the purpose and principles of
the existing order. This is also the reason why, in multi-ethnic states, the leaders
of the ruling majority try to incorporate reform-minded, moderate leaders from
minorities rather than radical or even revolutionary leaders (Pettai and Hallik
2002). They understand that moderates are easier and cheaper to co-opt than radi-
cals. Likewise, co-optees who agree with the order’s principles and purpose find it
easier to accept being co-opted – in return for institutional privileges they ‘merely’
have to provide support for an order or an institution they basically agree with.
Thus, the zone of agreement for a co-optation deal is much wider when there
are co-optees available that agree with the order’s social purpose and its fundamen-
tal principles (Abbott et al. 2019).
Overall, the availability of systemically relevant actors that agree with the social
purpose and principles of the order shapes the probability of co-optation (see
Table 2). This can be illustrated by comparing how, after World War II,
Germany, France, and Italy co-opted the labor unions into their economic regimes
(Scharpf 1978). Germany’s governments co-opted them into their corporatist
arrangements for managing the economy, because the labor unions were powerful
monopoly organizations representing the bulk of laborers. This was crucial for the
German governments’ efforts at economic management. At the same time, they
were moderate organizations that shared the governments’ commitment to a
coordinated market economy. In Italy and France, by contrast, the co-optation of
labor unions was much more difficult, because none of the numerous competing
3Drawing on traditional PTTs (Organski 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981), many PST con-
tributions highlight the distinction between reformist (satisfied) and revisionist (dissatisfied) powers
(Buzan 2010; Schweller 1994; Schweller and Pu 2011; Ward 2017). They typically underscore that institu-
tional adjustments in response to global power shifts are easier to attain with reformist than revisionist
powers (Buzan 2010; Paul 2016; Ward 2017). We agree but highlight that often these institutional adjust-
ments come through strategic co-optation.
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organizations was powerful enough to help the French or Italian governments in
their pursuit of managing the economy. Furthermore, significant parts of the
Italian and French labor unions were more radical than their reformist German
counterparts and they rejected the market economies in France and Italy.
The availability of able and willing co-optees also shapes the probability of
co-optation in cases of global power shifts. Accordingly, India’s rise to systemic
relevance to the NPT regime and its agreement with the regime’s social purpose
were major conditions of its co-optation into the regime in the early 2000s. As a
nuclear power with a fast-growing nuclear industry and leader of an increasingly
vocal coalition of developing countries that criticized the NPT regime for being dis-
criminatory, India became increasingly crucial – that is, systemically relevant – for
the NPT regime (Perkovich 2010). At the same time, India had also supported the
NPT regime’s most fundamental principles and its social purpose, that is, nuclear
non-proliferation. To be sure, India has always been a NPT regime critic, and
had even acquired a nuclear device in the 1970s outside of the NPT (Paul and
Shankar 2011). Nevertheless, despite its status as a non-signatory of the treaty,
India was an unequivocal supporter of nuclear non-proliferation. In fact, its
criticism was that the NPT regime required too little, rather than too much non-
proliferation (Weiss 2010, 260–262). Due to India’s agreement with the social
purpose of the regime, the USA and other established powers were able to tap
into its systemically relevant capacities to stabilize the NPT regime when it was
under threat (Perkovich 2010).
Similarly, China’s co-optation into the leadership of the IMF was facilitated by
the fact that China was systemically relevant for global financial stability and also
accepted the promotion of global financial stability as the IMF’s social purpose
(Ren 2015). China’s co-optation into the WTO and its later inclusion in the core
negotiation group was facilitated by its acceptance of the WTO’s free trade prin-
ciple, while at the same time its huge share of global trade made it systemically rele-
vant for the WTO (Hopewell 2015). The co-optation of BIC countries into the
leadership of global economic governance by means of a G20 upgrade was facili-
tated by the growing systemic relevance of BIC economies as well as their increasing
acceptance of the global order’s liberal economic principles (Kirton 2013).
Table 2. The availability of co-optees and the probability of co-optation
Systemic relevance No systemic relevance
Social purpose
agreed
Co-optation of critical reformists:
likely
(recognizing India’s nuclear
power status in the NPT regime)
Co-optation of minor reformists:
unlikely




Co-optation of critical revisionists:
unlikely
(including the Soviet Union in
global economic institutions)
Co-optation of minor revisionists:
very unlikely
(accepting G77 demands for a new
international economic order)a
aIn the 1970s, developing countries organized as Group of 77 (G77) called for a radically different New International
Economic Order. But established powers largely rejected their demands for an overhaul of the Bretton Woods
institutions and a substantial strengthening of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), because the
G77 was revisionist and not systemically relevant for global economic order.
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By contrast, the co-optation of the G4 (Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil) as per-
manent members of the UNSC failed not only due to third party resistance, but also
because the G4, while being in strong agreement with the social purpose of the
UNSC, lacked systemic relevance for the UNSC. To be sure, the G4’s inclusion
would have helped us to mobilize additional financial and military resources espe-
cially for peacekeeping (Blum 2005); but they were not critical for the functioning
of the UNSC. This limited the amount of costs established powers were willing to
bear and thus the efforts they were ready to make to bring about co-optation.
In sum, for co-optation to be likely, emerging powers need to be more than just
increasingly powerful. They are increasingly powerful by definition! They should
also have crossed the threshold of systemic relevance and be in agreement with
the social purpose of the existing order. They should be critical reformists rather
than minor revisionists.
Third-party resistance as a probability driver
So far, we have assumed that the probability of co-optation depends exclusively on
whether the co-optor and co-optee can find a co-optation agreement between
themselves. However, more often than not, the probability of co-optation also
depends on the acceptance of, or resistance to, co-optation by third parties. After
all, many co-optation accounts show that co-optation is detrimental to third parties
that are not part of the co-optation deal (Schmitter 1985; Lehmbruch 1987).
Therefore, we conceive co-optation parties’ institutional opportunities to overcome
third-party resistance as an important probability driver.
More often than not, third parties resist the exchange of privileges for support,
thereby increasing the costs and reducing the benefits of co-optation. Disregarded
candidates for co-optation in particular try to prevent the co-optation deal envi-
sioned by the co-optor and co-optee (Bolliger and Zürcher 2004; Wilson 2016).
They fear loss of status, influence and authority relative to the chosen co-optee.
For instance, the co-optation of additional German princes into the electorate
that selected the King of the Holy Roman Empire – that is, the prospective
Emperor – was typically met with fierce resistance from the princes who had
been hoping to become members of the electorate themselves (Wilson 2016).
The same pattern of ‘third-party resistance’ can be identified when, in the wake
of global power shifts, established powers try to co-opt emerging powers into the
international order and its institutions. The co-optation of the BIC countries
into the core leadership group of global economic governance through an upgrade
of the G20 was met with resistance from powers such as Switzerland and Singapore
that had not been invited to join the club (Cooper 2010; Cooper and Thakur 2013).
The attempted co-optation of the G4 into the club of the UNSC’s permanent mem-
bers faced resistance from, among others, Italy, which opposed the granting of a
permanent seat to Germany (Blum 2005, 646; Schirm 2010). China’s co-optation
into the IMF leadership through an increase in its voting shares was resisted by
some European powers that had to accept a decrease in their own (Wade 2011;
Keukeleire and Hooijmaaijers 2014). Finally, India’s co-optation into the NPT
regime was met with resistance from a group of like-minded states that were led
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by New Zealand and comprised of Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and
Switzerland (Varadarajan 2008; Mistry 2014, 187).
The more resistance third parties can generate, the higher the costs of
co-optation for co-optors and co-optees as they must find ways to overcome this
resistance. In extreme cases, the costs of overcoming third-party resistance may pre-
vent co-optation altogether. At any rate, third-party resistance shapes the probabil-
ity of co-optation as co-optors and co-optees must consider it in their cost–benefit
calculation. In our view, the ability of the co-optation parties to overcome third-
party resistance primarily depends on two institutional conditions (cf. Mahoney
and Thelen 2010). It depends, first, on third party veto power within the relevant
institution (Tsebelis 2002; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). The stronger (weaker) the
veto power of third parties, the more (less) costly it will be to overcome their resist-
ance which, in turn, makes co-optation less (more) likely. Second, it depends on the
co-optation parties’ options for co-optation outside the institution in question
(Alter and Meunier 2009; Helfer 2009; Morse and Keohane 2014; Lipscy 2017).
The broader (narrower) those options are, the less (more) costly it will be to over-
come third-party resistance which, in turn, makes co-optation more (less) likely. In
combination, these institutional conditions not only shape the costs of overcoming
third-party resistance and thus the probability of co-optation; but they also shape
co-optation parties’ strategies to overcome third-party resistance (see Table 3).
Breaking: In institutional settings where third parties have strong veto power and
co-optation parties have few opportunities for co-optation outside of the institution
in question, co-optation is very unlikely. Third parties are able to block any attempt
at adjusting the institution in ways that give the co-optee more privileges in return
for increased support, while the co-optation parties cannot simply move to another
institutional venue. Locked into the institutional status quo, the only option the
co-optation parties have is to break the resistance of recalcitrant third parties
(Lipscy 2017). Yet, breaking resistance is usually costly and, consequently,
co-optation is likely to fail under such circumstances.
The failed attempt to co-opt the G4 – Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan – into
permanent positions in the UNSC is illustrative. The G4’s ambitions faced resistance
from Italy, which opposed a permanent seat for Germany, from South Korea, which
expressed opposition to a Japanese seat, from Argentina, which was opposed to a seat
for Brazil, and from Pakistan, which rejected an Indian seat (Blum 2005, 646; Schirm








Co-optation by layering: very
likely
(including the BICs in the club
of leading economies via G20
upgrade)
Co-optation by shifting: quite
likely
(recognizing India’s nuclear





Co-optation by overruling: likely
(increasing China’s voting
shares in the IMF)
Co-optation by breaking:
unlikely
(granting the G4 permanent
seats in the UNSC)
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2010). These countries organized a veto coalition to ensure that the G4’s ambitions
would not gain the approval it required from the UN General Assembly (UNGA). At
the same time, the permanent members of the UNSC and the G4 had no outside
option. In international security, especially with regard to the legitimization of peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement, the UNSC has a constitutionally guaranteed mon-
opoly (Lipscy 2017). The G4 consequently tried to break resistance by offering
third countries trade concessions or threatening trade sanctions to muster the neces-
sary UNGA votes. In the end, this strategy was too costly, and the G4 had to give up
their ambition of gaining permanent UNSC seats in return for their substantive sup-
port of UN peace-missions (Blum 2005, 646; Schirm 2010).
Shifting: In institutional settings where reluctant third parties have strong veto
power but co-optation parties enjoy broad outside options, co-optation is some-
what more likely. While recalcitrant third parties can prevent internal institutional
adjustments that give co-optees additional institutional privileges, the co-optation
parties may shift to another institutional venue thereby circumventing third-party
resistance (Alter and Meunier 2009; Helfer 2009; Morse and Keohane 2014). While
shifting is costly, it is typically less costly than breaking third-party resistance
(Jupille, Mattli and Snidal 2013). The availability of such outside options thus
reduces the costs of overcoming resistance (Lipscy 2017). This renders co-optation
more likely.
India’s co-optation into the NPT regime provides an example. The USA –
supported by the UK, France, and Russia – never really considered fully recognizing
India under the NPT as a nuclear weapons state. Due to third-party resistance, the
required amendment to the NPT would have had no chance of being approved,
since it required the consent of 189 NPT member states. However, the wider
NPT regime gave the USA and India the option to seek unofficial recognition of
India as a nuclear power through an NSG waiver. The recognition of India’s status
as a nuclear power also met resistance in the NSG. In fact, the USA and India had
to break considerable resistance from some NSG members to secure the required
waiver (Varadarajan 2008). Still, by shifting from the NPT to the NSG, they were
able to circumvent the bulk of the resistance to recognizing India as a nuclear
weapon state. After all, the NSG had only 45 members compared with the NPT’s
189. Moreover, all NSG members were developed countries with nuclear industries.
These states could profit from nuclear trade with India and were thus less resistant to
recognizing India as a nuclear power than the developing countries without
such industries that were parties to the NPT. The latter had argued for years – as
had India – that the NPT’s distinction between nuclear-weapons states and
non-nuclear-weapon states was discriminatory (Srivastava and Gahlaut 2012, 101–
102). Shifting to the NSG thus facilitated India’s co-optation into the NPT regime.
Overruling: Co-optation is likely in institutional settings in which reluctant third
parties have no veto power to block the co-optation parties’ exchange of institutional
privileges for support. This even holds when the co-optation parties have few options
to engage in co-optation outside the institution in question. Overcoming third-party
resistance is less costly when disregarded candidates for co-optation have no veto
power that would allow them to block the co-optation agreement. Within the insti-
tution, third parties can be overruled if the co-optation parties command a construct-
ive majority. As third parties will usually understand that, without veto power, they
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have little leverage, the mere threat of overruling them may be sufficient for the
co-optation parties to bring them in line (Lipscy 2017).
China’s co-optation into the IMF leadership through an increase in its voting
shares provides an example. While some European powers that stood to lose voting
shares tried to prevent the required IMF reform, they did not constitute a blocking
minority and thus had no veto power. Even in the absence of options outside of the
IMF, the constructive majority that wanted China to be co-opted into the IMF lead-
ership was able to push through the required reforms. The recalcitrant European
powers could do little but accept the decrease in their respective voting rights.
They were not in a position to stop the granting of additional voting rights in return
for China’s increased financial IMF support (Wade 2011; Keukeleire and
Hooijmaaijers 2014).
Layering: Co-optation is even more likely in an institutional setting where not
only do reluctant third parties have little veto power, but co-optation parties
enjoy ample options to engage in co-optation beyond the focal institution. These
settings offer co-optors and co-optees very good opportunities to overcome third-
party resistance. They may simply overrule recalcitrant third parties; alternatively,
they may shift to another institution. However, both overruling and shifting typic-
ally create costs. Shifting creates transaction costs and undermines the original
institution’s authority; overruling typically alienates overruled third parties and
may thus create legitimacy costs. To minimize these costs, co-optation parties
may go for layering to overcome third-party resistance. Layering implies that the
co-optee gains institutional privileges within the original institution, rather than
in an outside institution to which the co-optation parties have shifted. However,
instead of pushing through a conversion of existing institutional structures, new
institutional structures are layered on top of the existing ones (Mahoney and
Thelen 2010). In this way, co-optees can gain institutional privileges without taking
pre-existing privileges away from other actors.
Arguably, the co-optation of the BICs into the core leadership of global eco-
nomic governance in 2008 was easy to achieve because candidate co-optees such
as Switzerland and Singapore had no veto power to block the concomitant upgrad-
ing of the G20. Moreover, the G7 had several options available. Instead of upgrad-
ing the G20 from a forum of finance ministers to a forum of heads of government
or state, they could have enlarged the membership of the existing G7. Alternatively,
an entirely new group could have been created to complement both the G7 and the
G20. In the end, they decided to layer an upgraded G20 on top of the pre-existing
forum of finance ministers. Layering was less costly than the alternatives, as it saved
the G7 from discussions about who should become a member of their exclusive
club. Through the decision to upgrade the G20, the membership issue was automat-
ically settled (Cooper 2010; Cooper and Thakur 2013).
Overall, our co-optation theory highlights that institutional adjustments to glo-
bal power shifts often do not simply require the consent of established and emer-
ging powers. Third-party resistance may cause them to fail. Emerging and
established powers’ institutional opportunities to overcome their resistance, thus,
have a strong impact on the probability of strategic co-optation.
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Unintended consequences: dynamic instabilities of strategic co-optation
Co-optation is a strategy used to stabilize order in the face of fundamental chal-
lenges and it can remain stable over time. Bismarck’s co-optation of the Catholic
and Protestant churches into the German nation-state after the so-called
Kulturkampf in the 1870s is still in place today. Similarly, the co-optation of
labor unions and employer associations into European welfare states lasted for
about five decades. The stability of these co-optation arrangements is easy to
explain. Like any institution, co-optation gains endogenous stability through
lock-in effects and increasing returns. From this institutionalist point of view,
co-optation becomes harder and harder to overthrow and thus more and more
stable over time (Pierson 2000).
While not denying that co-optation arrangements can remain stable over time,
our theory of strategic co-optation claims that co-optation arrangements do, at
times, become unstable. The exchange of institutional privileges for institutional
support is not always self-stabilizing; sometimes it proves to be self-undermining.
Paradoxically, the success of co-optation can lead to its failure (cf. Abbott et al.
2019). Co-optation occasionally has unintended consequences that may, over
time, contribute to its destabilization. In what follows we discuss how the support
provided by the co-optee on the one hand and the privileges granted to it on the
other may feed unintended consequences that undermine the stability of the initial
arrangement.
Support-driven instability
Paradoxically, the support provided by the co-optee may ultimately destabilize the
co-optation arrangement that initially gave rise to it. The more that support con-
tributes to overcoming the fundamental challenge that provided the rationale for
the co-optor and the co-optee to engage in co-optation, the more co-optation con-
tributes through various feedback loops to its own demise. Depending on whether
support from the co-optee is able to resolve the fundamental challenge entirely or
merely contain it temporarily, different kinds of endogenous instabilities may
emerge:
(1) If support from the co-optee resolves rather than simply contains the funda-
mental challenge, the co-optor is likely to resile from the initial arrangement. In this
case, the co-optor’s need for continued support from the co-optee diminishes. The
less the co-optor requires support, the more it gains leverage over the co-optee and
may push for the rescission of the institutional privileges that the co-optee gained
through co-optation. The initial co-optation deal comes under pressure, because,
thanks to its success in mobilizing support for overcoming the fundamental chal-
lenge, the co-optor can do without the co-optee. For example, the USA co-opted
the Kurds in Syria to provide support in its war against the so-called Islamic
State. However, once it considered this war to be won, the Trump administration
was no longer prepared to protect the Kurds against the Syrian and Turkish armies
(Nordland 2018).
This support-driven feedback, which provides the co-optor with leverage over
the co-optee, is also relevant to co-optation in the wake of the current global
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power shifts. Among other things, the BICs were co-opted into the core leadership
of global economic governance to cope with the challenges of the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis (Cooper 2010; Cooper and Thakur 2013). However, once the BICs and
other emerging economies had contributed to getting the financial crisis under
control, they were no longer needed to the same extent. The G7 was unable to offi-
cially downgrade the G20 and thus rescind the BICs’ privilege of membership in the
leadership group of global economic governance. Nonetheless, they began
re-emphasizing and upgrading the G7’s status as the key forum of global economic
governance. With the re-emergence of the G7, the co-optation arrangement has
been at least partially undone.
(2) However, institutional support does not necessarily contribute to the restor-
ation of the co-optor’s dominance. If the support provided by the co-optee proves
enough to contain, but not resolve, the fundamental challenge that motivated the
initial co-optation deal, the co-optee may resile from the existing co-optation
arrangement. Containing the challenge implies that the co-optor continues to
need support, so the co-optee will gain leverage to push for a revised co-optation
deal with additional institutional privileges. This is all the more likely if the
co-optor becomes accustomed to the co-optee’s support and less able or willing
to mobilize support from elsewhere. The initial co-optation deal comes under pres-
sure, because the co-optor can – and probably will – push for more and more pri-
vileges. This may lead to the point where the co-optor has no more privileges left to
grant. The Holy Roman Empire provides an example. To deal with challenges to his
authority, the Emperor continuously had to co-opt some of the princes by giving
them control over additional territories as fiefdoms. However, not only was the
amount of territory he could give out limited, but, through the increase in the ter-
ritory they controlled, the princes gained greater power to contest the Emperor’s
authority, which in turn increased the Emperor’s need for support. The more he
needed support, the more the princes gained leverage to push for more privileges
in return until, finally, one of the princes was powerful enough to capture the
crown (Wilson 2016).
This support-driven feedback, which gives leverage to the co-optee, is relevant
for co-optation in the wake of the current global power shifts as well. For example,
the more China has been co-opted into the US-led global financial order that is bol-
stered by the IMF and other institutions, the more the USA and other established
powers have become dependent on Chinese support in managing the global finan-
cial system – not only in times of crisis but also in ‘normal’ times. Consequently,
China is positioned to gain ever more procedural and substantive privileges in
the IMF and other global financial institutions. Examples of newly gained
Chinese privileges include a more favorable IMF surveillance system (Zangl et al.
2016) and IMF recognition of the legitimacy of capital controls (Chwieroth
2014), and of the Chinese currency, the Renminbi, as one of the institution’s reserve
currencies. This underlines how institutional support may give emerging powers
leverage over established powers and thus destabilize the initial co-optation
arrangement.
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Privileges-driven dynamics
It is not only the institutional support provided by the co-optee, but also the insti-
tutional privileges it gains that may ultimately destabilize the co-optation arrange-
ment that prompted the granting of these privileges. The privileges initially have a
stabilizing effect as they give the co-optee a stake in maintaining the order and in
providing the support the co-optor seeks. However, over time, the more the inter-
ests of the co-optor and the co-optee converge on maintaining the extant order and
its underpinning institutions, the greater the risk that third parties perceive the
co-optor and co-optee as an elite cartel that uses the existing order and its institu-
tions to dominate them politically or exploit them economically (Lazar 2017). Over
time, this feedback may intensify third-party resistance and broaden it well beyond
the initial resistance of disregarded candidates for co-optation. Co-optation may
even breed (more) resistance among the constituencies of both co-optation parties
(Dickson 2000), reducing the overlap of their ‘win-sets’ (Putnam 1988) and thus
endangering the continuation of the original co-optation arrangement (Bolliger
and Zürcher 2004, 62–63).
(1) The institutional privileges co-optees gain through co-optation may drive
a wedge between them and their own constituencies (Bolliger and Zürcher 2004,
62–63; Lake 2016). The more institutional privileges they gain, the more they
run the risk of their own constituencies regarding them as part of a distant elite
cartel (Dickson 2000). They may be conceived as being focused on their institu-
tional privileges and losing touch with their constituencies. For instance, union
leaders co-opted by the state are no longer seen as representing the workers
(Lazar 2017), while local state-builders co-opted by foreign powers are no longer
considered as representing the local population (Lake 2016). In these cases, the
institutional privileges for group leaders drive a wedge between privileged co-optees
and the ordinary group members they are expected to represent. This may endanger
existing co-optation arrangements if radicalized constituencies become unwilling to
follow their co-opted leaders or if these leaders feel the urge to reduce their support
for the existing order to show loyalty to their radicalized constituencies.
This privileges-driven feedback is also relevant for co-optation in the wake of the
current global power shifts. For example, China’s co-optation in the mid-2000s fol-
lowing the inclusion of Brazil and India into the WTO core negotiation group – the
so-called Quad – did not placate developing countries’ criticism of illegitimate
WTO procedures (Hopewell 2015; Zangl et al. 2016). Quite the opposite!
Developing countries expected China to act as a genuine representative of their
concerns in the WTO. When they learned that China was ready to strike deals
with the USA and the EU in closed-door negotiations rather than advocate for
their concerns, criticism of illegitimate WTO procedures intensified among devel-
oping countries. China, India, and Brazil were criticized for betraying their con-
stituencies: they had relied on their role as the voice of developing countries to
get into the privileged inner circle of WTO decision-making, but ceased to
represent developing countries’ interests once they were in the club. The emerging
powers then sought to redress the alienation of their constituencies by taking a
more confrontational stance towards established powers. This, in turn, put a strain
on the Doha Round negotiations, thereby endangering the initial co-optation deal
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which was meant to overcome the blockade at the Doha Round (Hopewell 2015;
Zangl et al. 2016).
(2) The institutional privileges granted to a co-optee may not only drive a wedge
between it and its constituency, but they can also alienate the constituencies of the
co-optor (Dickson 2000). The more co-optors grant institutional privileges to their
co-optees, the greater the risk that their constituencies will perceive them as
engaging in dodgy deals (Bolliger and Zürcher 2004, 62–63). This risk is particu-
larly severe when co-optors co-opt leaders of groups that are strongly opposed
by their own constituencies. For example, governments in young democracies
run the risk of being considered traitors by their voters if they co-opt police chiefs
who collaborated with authoritarian governments in the past (Fichtelberg 2018). In
such cases, the granting of institutional privileges to leaders of groups to whom the
co-optor’s constituencies are in stark opposition may drive a wedge between the
co-opting politicians and their constituencies. This is likely to endanger existing
co-optation arrangements if radicalized constituencies are no longer willing to sup-
port them or if leaders feel that they have to reduce the institutional privileges given
to co-optees or force them to increase their support to rein in their radicalized
constituencies.
This privileges-driven instability is also relevant for co-optation in the wake of
the ongoing global power shifts. One may argue, for instance, that the decades-long
co-optation of lesser powers into the US-led world order has contributed to grow-
ing anti-internationalist sentiments in the USA (Lake 2009; Zürn 2018). In this
view, increasing sections of the USA electorate have become increasingly opposed
to the costly granting of institutional privileges to an expanding number of allies,
whom they often perceive as either contributing too little support for the US-led
order or as being in opposition to American values or interests. In the wake of
the current power shift, the American electorate’s uneasiness with the US-led
order has fed into US President Trump’s allegations that, in the context of inter-
national institutions, some of his predecessors acted in the interests of America’s
international allies, with whom they formed an internationalist liberal elite cartel,
instead of acting in America’s own best interests (Toma 2018). His ‘America
First’ foreign policy can thus be seen as the attempt to retrench the co-optation
arrangements that backed the US-led world order and its institutions.
In sum, while strategic co-optation is subject to endogenous stabilities, it is also
exposed to endogenous instabilities. While not denying – and in fact assuming! –
that co-optation is often stable over time, we highlight that both institutional sup-
port from, and institutional privileges for, emerging powers may undermine the
initial co-optation arrangement. However, as of now, the conditions under which
these endogenous instabilities override co-optation’s endogenous stability remain
subject to further research.
Strategic co-optation beyond global power shifts
Drawing on several isolated accounts of strategic co-optation from other domains –
domestic and international, autocratic and democratic, past and present – we have
developed a theory of strategic co-optation as a mode of institutional adaption to
shifts in the global distribution of power. Our theory differs in important ways
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from extant PSTs of liberal (integrationist) or realist (accommodationist) origin (see
Table 4):
Conceptually, we have highlighted that institutional adjustments through
co-optation imply that established and emerging powers trade institutional privi-
leges for institutional support. Unlike accommodationist approaches, which focus
on how established powers have to accommodate emerging powers through
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institutional privileges (Paul 2016), and integrationist approaches, which underline
that emerging powers adjust themselves to the existing order (Ikenberry 2009, 2011a,
b), our co-optation theory emphasizes their mutual adjustment.
Our theory highlights three conditions as causes of strategic co-optation:
• Fundamental challenge: Co-optation is only possible if there is a fundamental
challenge to the existing order. Yet, in contrast to accommodationist and inte-
grationist PSTs, our institutionalist theory grasps the broad range of challenges
that an institutional order may face. While accommodationists identify
internal authority challenges (Kirshner 2012; Paul 2016) but overlook both
external and governance challenges, integrationists seem to assume that exter-
nal governance challenges are of paramount importance (Ikenberry 2009;
2011a; b) while ignoring both internal challenges and challenges to authority.
We, on the other hand, consider the full set of relevant challenges – to author-
ity and governance as well as internal and external.
• Co-optee availability: Co-optation is only likely if there are both willing and
able co-optees. However, in contrast to many PST contributions, our
co-optation theory conceives the systemic relevance of emerging powers (i.e.
their ability) and their agreement with the social purpose of the existing
order (i.e. their willingness) as – at least partly – independent of each
other. Accommodationist PSTs assume that the more powerful, and conse-
quently able, emerging powers are, the less willing they will be to stabilize
the order (Schweller and Pu 2011). Integrationist PSTs presume that the
more capable emerging powers become, the more of a stake they have in sus-
taining the order and the more willing they will be to contribute to stabilizing
it (Ikenberry 2009; 2011a; b). By contrast, we argue that emerging powers’
willingness to stabilize the order cannot simply be derived from their power
and thus their ability to do so. Their ability and their willingness have to be
assessed empirically and independently of each other.
• Third-party resistance: Co-optation is only likely if the institutional setting
allows the co-optation parties to overcome third-party resistance. Unlike exist-
ing PSTs – both accommodationist and integrationist – our theory highlights
that institutional adjustments to shifts in the global distribution of power often
require more than just the consent of established and emerging powers. Due
to third-party resistance, such adjustments may fail even in cases where emer-
ging and established powers agree. Therefore, we have specified the institu-
tional conditions under which it is likely that resistance to institutional
adjustments can be overcome.
Furthermore, with regard to the (unintended) consequences of strategic
co-optation, our theory diverges from both accommodationist and integrationist
PSTs in that it sheds light on endogenous dynamics leading to instability.
Integrationist PSTs argue that, through integration, emerging powers will be pro-
gressively socialized into an existing order that was created and maintained –
and is still dominated – by established powers. They thus underline endogenous
sources of stability (Ikenberry 2009, 2011a, b). Accommodationist PSTs highlight
the fact that established powers’ accommodation of emerging powers will likely
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stabilizes the order only temporarily (Kirshner 2012). If the current power shift
continues, today’s accommodation will come under pressure tomorrow. Hence,
they underline exogenous sources of instability. While we agree with both accounts,
our theory also identifies endogenous sources of instability.
Strategic co-optation is neither omnipresent nor a panacea for adapting inter-
national institutions to global power shifts. But it is important enough to warrant
its own approach. Theoretically coherent and conducive to empirical assessment,
our co-optation theory paves the way to a systematic analysis of strategic
co-optation in the wake of global power shifts.
Here we have merely tried to illustrate, through a variety of examples, that the
theory is well placed to shed light on how international institutions adapt to shifts
in the global distribution of power. Yet, to rigorously and comprehensively assess
the theory, more comparative research is required that studies international
institutions that are subject to global power shifts. One way of doing this would
be to study international institutions in which, in the context of the current global
power shift with the rise of China and the relative decline of the USA, one of our
conditions – fundamental challenge, co-optee availability, third party resistance –
varies over time and check whether this has the expected effect with regard to
institutional adjustment. Another way to assess our theory would be to rely on a
systematic comparison across a variety of international institutions in which
China has risen and the USA has experienced relative decline. One would have
to assess whether institutional adjustment is significantly more frequent in those
institutions in which the conditions specified by our theory – fundamental chal-
lenge, co-optee availability, institutional opportunities to overcome third party
resistance – are present.
Finally, yet another way to assess our theory would be to apply it even in pol-
itical domains beyond the adjustment of international institutions to global
power shifts. As the above examples ranging from authoritarian regimes to corpor-
atist arrangements and colonial empires suggest, our theory might well be suitable
to explain the adjustment of all kinds of institutionalized settings in which domin-
ant actors are facing power shifts that favor other actors. In all these settings, grant-
ing privileges in return for rising actors’ institutional support appears as a rational
strategy with which dominant actors can seek to stabilize the institutional status
quo. And in all these settings co-optation seems to depend on whether existing
institutions face a fundamental challenge to their authority or governance, whether
rising actors are both systemically relevant for the institution and in agreement with
its social purpose, and whether third parties have the opportunity to block the insti-
tutional adjustments that any co-optation deal between declining and rising actors
entails. Applying our theory to instances of co-optation beyond the domain of insti-
tutional adaptation to global power shifts thus promises new analytical insights on
the relevant phenomena and considerably enhances the reservoir of cases that could
be used to test our theory.
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